Evading the Transparency Tragedy: The Legal Enforcement of Corporate Sustainability Reporting by Ghoogassian, Chloe
Hastings Business Law Journal
Volume 11
Number 2 Summer 2015 Article 4
Summer 2015
Evading the Transparency Tragedy: The Legal
Enforcement of Corporate Sustainability Reporting
Chloe Ghoogassian
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_business_law_journal
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Business Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chloe Ghoogassian, Evading the Transparency Tragedy: The Legal Enforcement of Corporate Sustainability Reporting, 11 Hastings Bus. L.J.
361 (2015).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_business_law_journal/vol11/iss2/4
Evading the Transparency Tragedy: The
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing awareness that corporate social responsibility
("CSR") is crucial to the economic landscape of transnational
corporations. CSR generally refers to an "ongoing commitment by
businesses to behave ethically and to contribute to economic
development while demonstrating respect for people, communities,
society at large, and the environment."1 Many corporations are
adopting CSR measures as part of their mission statements and
general company practices. Most of the world's largest corporations
choose to adopt codes of conduct, and several volunteer annual
reports on their social practices2
Why do companies care about behaving ethically'? The case for
CSR initiatives is that they are beneficial from both a moral and
economic standpoint and are increasingly necessary for a
corporation's long term success.3 The morality rationale is that
"behaving as a good global citizen seems sensible, and even
* J.D. Candidate at University of Calif onia, Hastings College of the Law, May 2015; B.A.
Communication Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, 2012. The author thanks
Professor Jodi Short for her mentorship and guidance, as well as the editors of the Hastings
Business Law Journal for their hard work on this note. The author also thanks her family and
friends for all of their love and support.
1. See Brittany T. Cragg, Home is Where the Halt is: Mlandating Corporate Social
Responsibility Through Home State Regulation and SocialDisclosure, 24 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
735, 737 (2010) (quoting Jim Gustafson, Director of Executive Education for the Center for
Values-Driven Leadership, Benedictine University College of Business).
2. Id. at 735.
3. Id. at 736.
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instinctive."4  Corporations have come to recognize that "part of
being a good corporate citizen includes respecting the human rights of
those who come into contact with the corporation in some way,"
whether it is directly (employees or customers) or indirectly (workers
of suppliers, or people living in areas affected by a corporation's
activities).5 In fact, human rights are relevant to the economic, social,
and environmental aspects of corporate activities.6 The Economist
notes the "striking" trend of "how often activists, big firm[s] and
governments are in agreement about the importance of human rights,
and are working together to advance them."7 Further, stakeholders
and consumers are increasingly expecting corporations to act in a
socially responsible manner.8 In addition to the complex human
rights impact of economic globalization, transnational corporations
tend to have immense amounts of wealth and power, giving
corporations "at least a moral obligation to discover and consider the
social consequences of their actions. "' Thus, corporations are
seeking to increase their accountability and behave as good corporate
citizens through CSR initiatives. Simply put, corporations feel this is
the "right" thing to do.
Fortunately for corporations, the "right" thing to do is often the
"profitable" thing to do since there are also economic or self-
interested reasons to commit to CSR. Many empirical studies show
that corporate social and environmental performance are positively
associated with corporate financial performance, especially for
reputational purposes.10  First, CSR is attractive to consumers.
Buyers of products believe an honest company will produce better
products; some consumers even believe a commitment to CSR is an
4. Cragg, supra note 1, at 737.
5. Corporate Social Responsibility & Human Rights, AUSTRALIAN HUM. RIGHTS
COMMISSION, http://www.humanrights.gov.au/publications/corporate-social-responsibility-hum
an-rights (last visited Apr. 5, 2015).
6. Id.
7. See Jim Gustafson, Corporate Social Responsibilit: Are iou Giving Back or Just
GivingAua, in BUSINESS: THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE 372,372 (2d ed. 2006).
8. Id.
9. See Cragg, supra note 1, at 739.
10. See generally Marc Orlitzky et al., Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A
Mleta-Analysis, 24 ORG. STUD. 403 (2003) (discussing a debate about social/environmental
performance and financial performance for decades, but confirming the positive relationship in
a recent and more detailed study).
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indicator of a firm's honesty and reliability.11 Company commitment
to CSR thus serves as a form of advertisement to establish brand
loyalty among consumers, which in turn draws in greater profits for
companies>'2 Second, corporate advocacy of human rights contributes
to consumer investment strategy. For example, when founders of
Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc. committed their company to
donating 7.5% of its pretax profit to social causes, 3 they were able to
sell the company to Unilever for $326 million-a 150 percent
premium over the trading price of its stock when the takeover was
initiated.1 4 This demonstrates that global companies recognize CSR
initiatives as value added to a company.
However, many corporations do not practice what they preach.
When profits are the driving goal of corporations, there is a big
temptation to evade social responsibility. A study that asked what
happens when companies engage in socially responsible behavior
concluded that corporations focusing on pursuing a socially
responsible agenda are more likely than other businesses to behave in
socially irresponsible ways.1 5 The study found that self-licensing, or
"moral licensing," morally frees people to worry less about the
consequences of being immoral.1 6  For example, Enron led an
extraordinary level of corporate philanthropy branding in the years
leading up to one of the greatest acts of corporate fraud in history by
the company.17 As a result, unconscious self-righteous branding
sometimes leads to irresponsible behavior, often leaving human rights
abuses and environmental impacts unchecked.18
These abuses are particularly likely to go unchecked in a more
globalized economy, where governance gaps create transparency
11. See Donald S. Siegel & Donald F. Vitaliano, An Empirical Analysis of the Strategic
Use of Corporate SocialResponsibiliti, 16 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 773,776 (2007).
12. Id.
13. 1999 CERES Report: Community Participation & Accountabilitv, BEN & JERRY'S ICE
CREAM, http://www.benj erry.com/company/sear/1999-ceres/page5.cfm (last visited Mar. 8,
2014).
14. Executive Reading, AM. WAY (Feb 15. 2004), http://www.americanwaymag.com/jeffrey-
hollender-ben-cohen-corporate-social-responsibility-j erry-greenfield.
15. Gary Belsky, The Dounside of Corporate Social Responsibilitji TIME (Dec. 3, 2013),
http://business.time.com/2013/12/03/the-downside-of-corporate-social-responsibility.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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challenges in global supply chains. The emergence of globalization
has created governance gaps, leading to an unbridled system of
human rights abuses by corporations.19 The scope of larger scale
economic forces have hindered societal capacity to manage the
negative consequences that often come along with economic power.
There have been many transformative changes in the global economic
landscape during the last two decades. First, the dynamics of
economic globalization have shifted the site of manufacturing from
developed to developing countries.20 Second, global companies'
production and supply chains are increasingly transcending national
boundaries' 1 However, the legal framework to regulate transnational
corporations has not entirely caught up with the complexities of the
globalized business landscape, making it difficult to determine which
entity is accountable for human rights harms.2 There is a widely held
perception that economic globalization has created an unregulated
system of rapidly growing global corporations and markets. 3
Accordingly, transnational corporations are said to carelessly exert
their power without any responsibility or accountability. 4 There has
been a dramatic increase in both the scale and complexity of human
rights abuses as well as the globalized international production
methods from which these abuses arise. The fundamental challenge
in holding transnational corporations accountable to their human
rights and environmental violations is ultimately for narrowing the
gaps between all of the actors in global supply chains by increasing
transparency in corporations' activities abroad.
One way to hold multinational corporations more accountable
for their social and environmental performance is increasing company
19. See generaliy John Ruggie, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
PROTECT, RESPECT AND REMEDY: A FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
(2008), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf.
20. THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 159 (Walter Mattli and Ngair Woods eds.,
Princeton Univ. Press 2009).
21. Id.
22. See Ruggie, supra note 19.
23. See THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION, supra note 20, at 160.
24. See Peter Newell, Environmental NG~s and Globalization, in GLOBAL SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS, 121 (Robin Cohen & Shirin Rai eds., 2000).
25. See Paul Redmond, Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for Standard
Setting and Compliance, 37 INT'L LAW. 69,69 (2003).
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transparency through practices like sustainability reporting6
Corporations use sustainability reporting to "disclose the processes
they use to manage CSR issues and their performance on these
matters.' 7  This provides stakeholders (such as customers,
shareholders, and NGOs) with information to "hold corporations
accountable and pressure them to improve performance if needed.'" 8
To date, most sustainability reporting has been entirely
voluntary: companies may choose whether to report or not, have
significant discretion about the scope and substance of what they
report, and are not subject to legal consequences for failing to report
or misreporting their activities. Voluntary reporting is a key feature
of current sustainability guidelines, which has led to what some have
called a "transparency tragedy.'"' 9 Many stakeholders complain about
the incomplete information in the reports, the lack of consistency
from year to year, the inability to compare social report data between
companies, among other problems.30  Not only is the lack of
information an issue for stakeholders, but so is the high volume and
low quality of information that render assessing the truth or falsity of
corporate communications increasingly difficult. 3' The quality of
these reports creates a vicious cycle; as a result of the poor quality of
information in these reports, stakeholders are not likely to use them
and thus apply less pressure on corporations to adopt better social
reporting practices. 3  The fact that corporations often use
sustainability reports for branding purposes also causes stakeholders
to further reduce their demand of quality social reporting.33
26. See, e.g., Dominque Bessire, Corporate Social Responsibilitv From Transparency to
-Constructive Conflict", in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY 65, 65 (David Crowther & Nicholas Capaldi eds., 2008) ("[In the domains of
CSR and corporate governance] the necessity for transparency is taken for granted and is very
seldom question.").
27. See David Hess, Combating Corruption through Corporate Transparenci: Using
Enforcement Discretion to Improve Disclosure, 21 MINN. J. INT'L L. 42, 54 (2012).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 55.
30. Id.
31. See Adam Sulkowsi & Steven White, Financial Performance, Pollution Mleasures, and
the Props enitI to Use Corporate Responsibiliti R eporting." Implications for Business and L egal
Scholarship, 21 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 491, 494 (2010).
32. See Hess, supra note 27, at 55.
33. Id.
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Thus, although sustainability reporting is a mechanism for
improving labor and human rights practices in global supply chains, it
has had limited effects to date because of its voluntary nature.
Embracing a uniform reporting standard and making companies
legally accountable for the veracity and completeness of their
disclosures could enhance the efficacy of sustainability reporting.
Generally, this Note explores how such a system could be structured.
Part II of this note describes the Global Reporting Initiative
("GRI") as a case study of sustainability reporting and some of its
shortcomings. Specifically, Part II will address how the voluntary
nature of GRI's Reporting Guidelines is preventing the complete
realization of increased transparency and stakeholder trust in
organizations. To solve the shortcomings of voluntary reporting
guidelines, Part III of this note will introduce the comply-or-explain
mechanism, which is a possible mandatory reporting structure. Part
III will describe comply-or-explain policies generally, discuss
arguments supporting and critiquing them, and analyze GRI's
attempt to adapt them for its own reporting standards. Because
comply-or-explain alone does not hold companies accountable to the
degree of accuracy in their disclosures, Part IV discusses how there
must exist an enforcement structure to find companies liable for
misrepresentation. More specifically, Part IV also describes the
framework of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act and how
"materiality" should be interpreted to include non-financial
disclosures since a company's social and environmental information is
material information to investors.
II. THE GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE ("GRI") AS A
CASE STUDY OF GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
The Global Reporting Initiative ("GRI") is a private non-profit,
transnational regulatory body that has produced the leading standard
for corporate sustainability reporting.34 GRI is an organization that
promotes the use of sustainability reporting as a way for companies to
34. See Galit A. Sarfaty, Regulating Through Numbers: A Case Stud of Corporate
SustainabilitrReportin, 53 INT'L VA. J. INT'L L. 575,578 (2013).
Vol. 11:2
CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY REPORTS
contribute to sustainable development.35  Companies and
organizations use GRI's developed Sustainability Reporting
Guidelines to report their economic, environmental, and social
impacts caused by their everyday activities.36 GRI has contributed to
a significant growth in corporations' adoption of social reporting
practices.37
GRI's mission is to make sustainability reporting a standard
practice for all companies and organizations, and to enable greater
organizational transparency and accountability.38  Through
transparent reporting, GRI's goal is to build stakeholders' trust in
organizations and to develop long-term sustainable and socially
responsible practices among companies and organizations. 39  GRI
recommends that disclosures and quantitative indicators in company
reports must reflect impacts and enable stakeholders to make
decisions. 40  Hence, by making corporate sustainability more
mainstream, GRI claims that it is "operationalizing emerging norms
on corporate responsibility for human rights, among other issues. 4 1
By systemizing disclosures about CSR practices, this institution is
making abstract human rights norms more concrete, measurable, and
routine, making it easier for corporations to integrate social reporting
into their practices.
GRI's goals are accomplished through complete disclosure of
information on topics and indicators required to reflect impacts that
enable stakeholders to make decisions.4) First, GRI determines the
topics and indicators on which the organizations should report.43
35. See generali GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, https://www.globalreporting.org (last
visited Mar. 8, 2014) (describing the Global Reporting Initiative) [hereinafter GRI website].
36. Id.
37. KPMG INT'L, KPMG INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY REPORTING 2008 36-38 (2008), available at https://www.kpmg.
com/EU/en/Documents/KPMG-InternationaI survey-Corporate responsibility-Survey-Report
ing_2008.pdf.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See generally GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, SUSTAINABILITY REPORTING
GUIDELINES (2011), available at https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/G3.I-Guide
lines-Incl-Technical-Protocol.pdf [hereinafter GRI G3.1] (providing sustainability reporting
guidelines to corporations).
41. See Sarfaty, supra note 34, at 580.
42. See GRI website, supra note 35.
43. See GRI G3. 1, supra note 40.
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Second, GRI ensures the quality and appropriate presentation of the
information.44 In the most recent version of the GRI Reporting
Guidelines, guidance is provided on how corporations should develop
the content of their reports and the information that must be included
in the reports. 4 The main body of the report consists of disclosures
addressed toward a corporation's general management approach and
performance regarding various specified categories of economic,
environmental, and social issues.46 GRI's Reporting Guidelines have
a section on "defining report content" where each organization and
company must generally meet GRI's standards on materiality,
stakeholder inclusiveness, sustainability context, and completeness.47
Additionally, GRI has a section on ensuring quality and appropriate
presentation of reported information where disclosures must be
balanced (i.e., reflect positive and negative aspects of an
organization's performance), comparable, accurate, timely, clear, and
reliable. 4 Both sections include a detailed checklist that disclosing
companies should meet in their reports.49
GRI contends its sustainability reporting structure will achieve
company transparency for a number of reasons. First, GRI believes
that this sustainability reporting process is expected to improve
organizational credibility and reputation with investors, customers,
and community members.0 Companies will realize that they need to
obtain a kind of "social license to operate" from stakeholders and
society in general (in addition to meeting governmental regulation
requirements); therefore, the ability of a company to speak
transparently about its economic, environmental, and social aspects of
its business operations in a trustworthy way is extremely valuable to
company-stakeholder relationships."' Second, the GRI reporting
process can help companies consider realistic and feasible steps
44. See GRI 03.1, supra note 40.
45. Id.
46. See Hess, supra note 27, at 58.
47. See GRI 63.1, supra note 40.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, STARTING POINTS (2011, available at https://
www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/Starting-Points-2-63.1.pdf.
51. Id. at 10.
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toward building a sustainable future.>' Additionally, transparency
and dialogue with stakeholders ensure that companies are living up to
their stated social commitments and making socially responsible
decisions in their business practices.53
Despite the lofty goals and some successes that GRI can claim
for sustainability reporting, a major shortcoming of GRI's Reporting
Guidelines is that it is completely voluntary and does not have an
enforcement mechanism in place to meet GRI's policy goals.
Because of the reporting guidelines' voluntary structure, it is not clear
that all relevant information is being disclosed or that the information
disclosed is accurate. Although GRI encourages both positive and
negative reporting, the actual company reports include mostly
positive information about company improvements and their
contribution to sustainability, human rights, and social performance.
The reports include minimal negative information, if any.
For example, Dell has a link on its report that directs readers to
some clarifying questions and responses related to the accuracy of
reports that stakeholders raised regarding Dell's drafted report.54
There is not much evidence to show that other companies do the
same (or at least this information is not available to the public). Dell
has a single section found on the second to the last page of their
report, dedicated to showing auditor findings on labor, health and
safety, environment, management system, ethical shortcomings, and
the actions that Dell took to correct them.55 The report thus includes
very minimal negative data and is displayed toward the tail end of the
report, which stakeholders and other readers may easily brush over.
Dell's report illustrates how the voluntary and unenforceable
character of GRI's Reporting guidelines makes company
transparency a difficult goal to achieve. Thus, the existence of many
exceedingly "positive" company reports illustrates the need for an
enforcement mechanism for voluntary sustainability reporting.
52. GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, supra note 50, at 40.
53. Id.
54. DELL, FY13 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY SUMMARY REPORT (2013), available at
http://i.del.com/sites/doccontent/corporate/corp-comm/en/Documents/dell-fvl3-cr-report.pdf.
55. Id.
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III. COMPLY-OR-EXPLAIN APPROACH
One of the ways in which voluntary sustainability reporting
structures can evade the transparency tragedy is if they embrace a
uniform reporting standard that holds companies accountable to the
completeness of the disclosures they make. The comply-or-explain
approach is a flexible corporate governance regime that provides
uniform reporting principles rather than strict regulations. The
comply-or-explain approach goes one incremental step beyond
voluntary reporting policies like the GRI: Although comply-or-
explain makes standards somewhat voluntary, it selects a uniform set
of standards that requires an explanation for the deviation from those
standards. In fact, GRI has adapted a model similar to comply-or-
explain in order to advocate for regulation in sustainability reporting.
This section will describe comply-or-explain policies generally, discuss
arguments supporting and critiquing them, and analyze GRI's
attempt to adapt them for its purposes.
A. THE GEZNERAL FRAMEWORK OF COMPLY-OR-EXPLAIN
In 2000, the U.K. introduced the comply-or-explain approach for
corporate governance. 6 The U.K.'s governance regime is rooted in
the Corporate Governance Code ("Governance Code"), which
establishes a set of governance principles for companies to adhere to
while producing annual financial reports for shareholders. s7 Many
other countries use a similar comply-or-explain approach as well,
including Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, China, Germany,
Honk Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico,
Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, and Sweden. s8 Each country
adopts its own comply-or-explain model, which is mirrored very
similarly to the U.K.'s Governance Code.
In the U.K., the comply-or-explain approach simply requires
companies to report whether or not they comply with the Governance
56. See Sarah Jane Leake, Is Comply or Eplain Here to Stayr:, BLOOMBERG LAW (AUG.
12,2011), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/law-reports/comply-or-explain/.
57. Id.
58. See Cyrus Afshar & Paul Rose, Capital Markets Competitiveness: A Survey of Recent
Reports, 2 ENTREPREN. Bus. L.J. 439, 462 (2007).
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Code designed by the U.K. government.59 If a company fails to
comply, it must provide reasons to its shareholders for its deviation.60
Companies that do not meet the code's provisions have to explain
their reasons for doing so and have the freedom to adapt and develop
best practices for their company. 61
Deviations are perfectly acceptable if well explained and good
explanations do not necessarily have to be long.62 Companies may
give a "short, but convincing reason why following a particular
recommendation of the code has not been considered to be in the
interest of the company as seen by its board., 63  Under these
conditions, deviations seem to be well received by investors.64
Explanations are "key to the success of the comply-or-explain
mechanism," even though there is room for improvement in this
area. 65
The use of codes for regulating corporate governance is "widely
accepted in practice and in economic and legal theory because of its
well known advantages over legal rules., 66 These advantages include
"flexibility, motivation to cooperate and to live up to best practice,
adaptability to the challenges and needs of the national and
international markets and possibility to try out new solutions and to
change them easily if they do not prove successful. 67 The comply-or-
explain system is said to possess flexibility because companies are free
to tailor their corporate governance policies to their individual needs
and evolving circumstances.68 Some deviation from the Governance
Code's provisions is permissible, so long as the reasons for doing so
are clearly explained and the underlying principle of the Code is
met.69 Drafters of the code realized that "in view of a company's
59. Afshar & Rose, supra note 58, at 461.
60. Id
61. Id
62. See Peter Bockli et al., Making Corporate Governance Codes More Effective: A
Response to the European Commission's Action Plan of December 2012, 3 (Dec. 11, 2013),
available athttp://ssrn.com/abstract-2366273.
63. Id. at 7-8.
64. Id at 3.
65. Id
66. Id
67. Id
68. See Afshar & Rose, supra note 58, at 462.
69. Id
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varying size, activities, shareholder structure, and culture, departure
from the provisions may be justified in particular circumstances. , 7
Smaller or newer companies may determine that some provisions of
the code are disproportionate or less relevant to their company
practices.7 For example, in Germany, it has been reported that larger
companies more often comply, and smaller companies generally take
greater advantage of the ability to explain. 72 Therefore, as compared
with mandatory disclosure structures, the comply-or-explain model is
particularly attractive to companies because it allows for
consideration of the complexity of corporate practices.73 Justified
non-compliance "encourages directors to modify their governance
strategies and approaches in light of evolving circumstances. , 74
Additionally, the flow and quality of information provided in the
explanation can assist shareholders in assessing the accuracy of
managerial decisions and pressing for change if they are not satisfied
with what is reported.7 The general hope of the comply-or-explain
implementation is that a constant flow of information regarding
corporate practices is assured, providing a foundation for better
corporate governance practice in the European Union ("EU"). 76
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE COMPLY-OR-EXPLAIN APPROACH
One critique of comply-or-explain is that mandatory disclosure
for non-compliance is costly and unnecessary.77  Compelling
management to give an explanation is "unnecessary since managers
having a reasonable explanation for non-compliance will naturally
have an incentive to provide that explanation., 78 Further, compulsory
compliance may cause investors to be suspicious and "sanction
70. See Annalean Steeno, Corporate Governance: Economic Analysis of a -Comply or
Explain "Approach, 11 STAN. J.L. Bus. & DN. 387,389 (2006).
71. Id.
72. See Leake, supra note 56.
73. See Shuannge Wen, Less Is Afore: a Critical view of Further EU Action Towards a
Harmonized Corporate Governance Frameiork in the gake of the Crisis, 12 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 41, 71 (2013).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 72.
77. See Steeno, supra note 70, at 404.
78. Id.
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companies that fail to give an explanation for their non-
compliance."7 9 It may also impose additional costs on companies to
provide this information.'
Further, the main challenge to a comply-or-explain approach is
the lack of enforcement.81 Self-regulation of codes alone is not
enough, because even if many of the companies comply, there are
always some black sheep that do not cooperate and, even worse,
profit from "free-riding."' In other words, since there is no
enforcement mechanism in place for disclosures, those free-riding
companies may be able to get away with not complying with the code.
This is unacceptable because it produces unjust practices and also
"erodes the cooperativeness of the majority and in the end leads to
the full breakdown of the code." 83 To meet this challenge, "it is now
general international practice to require disclosure of compliance or
not-compliance, whether by non-legal or legal means." 84  This
disclosure is needed in order to "inform the fellow-addresses, the
competitors, the financial press and the general public and on this
basis to allow them to react by valuating the compliance or the
noncompliance." '  The information provided must be meaningful.
Mere "box-ticking and boiler plate language are not enough to
activate the reaction mechanism at the market and in the public."86
Yet, the question of how this type of enforcement must occur remains
open-ended.
79. See Steeno, supra note 70, at 404.
80. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanism of~arket Efficienci- 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 635-41 (1984) (discussing the mandatory character of disclosure under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
81. See Bockli et al., supra note 62, at 4.
82. Id
83. Id
84. Id
85. Id
86. Id
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C. GRI SHOULD DRIVE STATE GOVERNMENTS TO ADOPT THE
COMPLY-OR-EXPLAIN APPROACH
GRI is currently pushing for the Report or Explain Campaign
Forum, which is very similar to comply-or-explain.87 The Campaign
Forum involves a group of people (generally, any individuals and/or
non-profit organizations who believe that sustainability reporting is
necessary and beneficial) who aim to increase organizational
transparency worldwide.88 This group urges companies to reveal their
performance through sustainability reporting or the reasons why they
do not report." The Campaign Forum claims to advance the
sustainability reporting agenda in a number of ways, including
encouraging organizations and individuals to join the Campaign
Forum to share information on developments and initiatives on the
disclosure of sustainability information. The Campaign Forum also
calls on companies and regulators to make a substantial change on
disclosure and transparency, and encourages governments to initiate
minimum sustainability disclosure regulation. 90  The Campaign
Forum advocates for regulation in sustainability reporting; however,
they do not necessarily call for mandatory reporting.91 Their rationale
is that such an approach could persuade more companies to report
while still being free to choose what information to disclose. Since
the Campaign Forum creates a norm for reporting, companies are
conveying information about their activities even when they decline
to make disclosures because nondisclosure deviates from the
reporting norm, raising doubts among stakeholders regarding a
company's social practices; in turn, markets and society have
information from these companies to judge their choices. 9' This in
turn affects shareholder decisions to invest in companies while
companies are put on greater notice about their public image. 93
87. Report or Explain Campaign Forum, GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE,
https://www.globalreporting.org/network/report-or-explain/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr.
5, 2015).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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GRI should drive state governments to adopt domestic
regulations in order to require companies to issue sustainability
reports that "comply" with GRI reporting standards or "explain" why
they do not. A country must first mandate sustainability reporting
since most countries do not currently have such a mandate. This step
will push companies to report. Second, the country will then have to
require that these company reports "comply" with GRI guidelines or
"explain" why they do not. Thus, the state law will not only mandate
sustainability reporting, but will also mandate companies to report in
compliance with uniform GRI guidelines or explain why they do not
comply. Under this regime, comply-or-explain will increase company
transparency and stakeholder trust by requiring both mandatory
sustainability reporting and compliance with the reporting guidelines.
Because companies are not required to completely disclose all of
their information, GRI's transparency goals are seldom met. With
the authority of a state, comply-or-explain can help alleviate some of
these issues. First, comply-or-explain makes it mandatory for all
companies to report based on the Governance Code. Similarly, state
regulation can make it mandatory for all companies to report based
on GRI's Reporting Guidelines. In this sense, the mandatory
reporting will compel all companies to be more transparent about
their practices. Second, the fact that companies must explain why
they deviate from the Reporting Guidelines with this approach will
hold them accountable for their corporate practices. Since these
companies are conveying information about their activities even when
they decline to make disclosures, shareholders will scrutinize these
companies and judge them based on the type of information they
convey. Shareholders will thus have greater leverage over company
deviations, which will in turn drive companies to be more transparent
and socially responsible. Since GRI's Report or Explain Campaign
Forum is already modeled after the similar comply-or-explain
mechanism, GRI should work to convince state governments to
mandate the comply-or-explain approach. This mandate will allow
GRI to use its reporting principles to increase organizational
transparency and corporate social responsibility.
There must be a stronger enforcement mechanism in place to
hold companies accountable to accurate reporting and socially
responsible practices. Neither GRI's Campaign Forum nor the
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comply-or-explain approaches have legal enforcement over the
absence of disclosures or misrepresentation of company information.
Though there are benefits to the flexibility of these approaches,
stakeholders will never know whether or not a company is completely
truthful and will be unable to make informed investment decisions.94
Each country will mandate the implementation of code compliance,
yet will fail to cater to the complementary need for proper monitoring
and disciplining mechanisms for both the "complying" and
"explaining" components of the mechanism.95 Therefore, the comply-
or-explain approach alone is insufficient.
IV. NEXT STEPS: HOLDING CORPORATIONS LIABLE
FOR INCOMPLETE REPORTS
Even if countries were to adopt a comply-or-explain approach to
mandate companies to report under the GRI guidelines, there would
be no enforcement mechanism to police the veracity of disclosures or
explanations. The primary weakness of comply-or-explain is that the
accuracy of reports is not legally enforced. This Note has therefore
demonstrated that both voluntary reporting (i.e., under GRI) and
voluntary reports combined with a comply-or-explain regime are
inadequate. Neither is adequate to resolve the transparency tragedy.
Consequently, in this section, I propose an enforcement structure to
hold companies accountable for the accuracy and completeness of
their reports. In order to really solve the problem of poor
transparency standards in global supply chains, a source of legal
accountability must be introduced. The Securities Exchange Act of
1934 ("the 1934 Act") provides a model for doing just that.
The 1934 Act is a set of laws that form the legal foundation for
the corporate disclosure requirements enforced by the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC").96 The overarching purpose of
securities laws are to protect investors from fraudulent or
manipulative practices, to ensure the efficient functioning of
94. See GRI website, supra note 35.
95. Id.
96. See David Monsma & Timothy Olson, Aluddling Through Counterfactual Alaterialit
and Divergent Disclosure: The Necessari Search for a Duty to Disclose Alaterial Non-Financial
Information, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 137, 145 (2007).
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securities markets, and arguably to promote in corporate
management a greater sense of public accountability. 97 Rule 10b-5 of
the 1934 Act prohibits the use of any means or instrumentality to
employ any "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," and creates
liability for any misstatement or omission of a material fact-i.e., a
fact that investors would think was important to their decision to buy
or sell the stock.98
A. DEFINITION OF "MATERIALITY" UNDER THE CURRENT
FRAMEWORK
Materiality is the "legal benchmark for determining the
significance of information for disclosure purposes.",99 "Full and fair
disclosure of all material information" is said to protect investors. 100
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. defined a material fact as "one
to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would attach importance in making a decision because the fact would
significantly alter the 'total mix' of available information. "10 Liability
under the 1934 Act is limited to material nondisclosure or
misrepresentation.'0 -  However, this is a subjective legal standard
since there is no bright line rule for what is precisely material.10 3
Most economic disclosures ensure a level of transparency
necessary to promote investor confidence in the truth and accuracy of
issuing companies' financial statements.10 4  The antifraud theory
underlying disclosure rules is that transparency prevents "low-quality
97. Monsma & Olson, supra note 96.
98. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015).
99. See Joseph A. Franco, Ibi Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough: The Significance
of Opportunism, Candor and Signaling in the Economic Case for Mlandator Securities
Disclosure, 20(0 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 223, 298-99 (2002).
100. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 96, at 141.
101. TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
102. See PAUL VIZCARRONDO, JR., WACHTIELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, LIABILITIES
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 11 (2013), available at http://www.
wlrk.com/docs/OutlineofSecuritiesLawLiabilities2Ol3.pdf.
103. Steven M. Davidoff, In Corporate Disclosure, a Alurki Definition of Mlaterial, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, http://dealbook.nvtimes.com/2011/04/05/in-corporate-disclosure-a-murky-
definition-of-material!?_php-true&-type -blogs&_r-0.
104. See Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital larkets, Corporate Disclosure and Enron, 89
CORNELL L. REv. 394, 411 (2004).
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firms from making misrepresentations that cause investors to
mistakenly believe that they are high-quality firms."' ' This emphasis
on transparency from an economic perspective turns on the term
"materiality. "106
Although SEC regulations in defining materiality "do not
explicitly adopt an economic standard, the SEC implicitly defines
material information as information that bears on the economic value
of an investment." 07 Rule 405, promulgated under the Securities Act
of 1933, defines material information to be those "matters [as] to
which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would attach importance in determining whether to purchase the
security registered. '1 0 8  This view of materiality "assumes a
'reasonable investor' [is someone] who is interested in the direct and
quantitative economic effect of the contested information. '109
Therefore, the analysis of the scope of the SEC disclosure rules thus
far has focused on "a concept of materiality that emphasizes the
quantitative economic effects of the withheld information on the
financial condition and prospects of a company.55"O
The dominant view of material disclosures is that a company is
"not obligated to disclose so-called social and environmental
information because such information is not ... relevant or material
to the financial condition of the company."11. In the absence of a
specific duty to disclose the social and environmental information
about a corporation, "traditional antifraud rules do not affirmatively
require firms to make [such] disclosures."11 2
Nonetheless, sustainability disclosures arguably fall under the
existing standard for economic "materiality" because companies'
sustainability practices may have economic consequences for
businesses. GRI currently asserts that reports on company
105. Macey, supra note 104.
106. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 96, at 142.
107. See Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparenci; 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1264 (1999).
108. Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2015).
109. See Robert G. Vaughn, America 's First Comprehensive Statute Protecting Corporate
Whistleblowers, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 33 (2005).
110. Id. at 43.
111. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 96, at 161.
112. See Macey, supra note 104, at 413.
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sustainability practices affect a company's profits and financial status,
and therefore reveal "material" information. GRI finds nonfinancial
information disclosures essential to stakeholder decision-making,
stating that such disclosures allow companies to "enhance their value,
measure and manage change, and drive improvement and
innovation."113 Furthermore, companies themselves increasingly view
non-economic information as "ultimately having an effect on
profitability."14 Companies routinely collect and manage
nonfinancial information about business functions, such as
environmental performance and corporate social responsibility, some
of which is arguably material to investors and the financial condition
of the company. 5  Under existing GRI values and company
practices, disclosures under the GRI Reporting Guidelines contain
"material" information that can be monitored under the current
structure of the 1934 Act.
In fact, the February 2014 update of the GRI Reporting
Guidelines ("G4") focuses on providing guidance to companies on
what disclosures are truly material. 6 By putting a spotlight on
materiality, GRI hopes to make abstract sustainability information
more tangible and concrete and to help companies "set goals,
measure performance, and manage change," which are "matters
directly related to an organization's core business strategy."1 7 The
updated GRI guidelines set "the concept of materiality at the heart of
sustainability reporting" by "encouraging reporting organizations to
only provide information on the issues that are really critical in order
to achieve the organization's goals for sustainability and manage its
impact on environment and society.""8 GRI says that reports under
the G4 guidelines should reflect the company's significant economic,
environmental, and social impacts that will substantively influence the
assessments and decisions of stakeholders.1 9 Thus, GRI's guideline
113. See -eneralli GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, AN INTRODUCTION TO G4, available at
https://www.globalreporting.org/resourcelibrary/GRI-An-introduction-to-64.pdf [hereinafter
INTRODUCTION TO G4].
114. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 96, at 142.
115. Id.
116. See AN INTRODUCTION TO 04, supra note 113.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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updates reflect the notion that certain sustainability disclosures are
"material." Because GRI is helping companies determine exactly
what kinds of material disclosures to include in their reports, it
explicitly suggests that these disclosures fit under the existing 1934
Act definition of "material."
B. THE DEFINITION OF "MATERIAL" SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO
INCLUDE NON-ECONOMIC DISCLOSURES
If it is argued that the existing meaning of "material" under the
1934 Act does not include noneconomic disclosures, then "material"
should be expanded to include noneconomic disclosures, making it
possible to hold corporations liable for misrepresenting non-
economic and social information.' 20
There are several reasons why "materiality" should apply to non-
financial information. First, while a general duty to disclose
environmental, social, and governance information does not
necessarily exist, an "obligation to accurately disclose this
information may be inferred from the intents and purposes of the
securities disclosure laws."'"'  For example, Regulation S-K, a
comprehensive set of regulatory guidelines under federal securities
law, supplements securities laws by requiring disclosure of certain
information independent of its strict materiality."' More specifically,
Item 303 requires companies to provide in clear narrative form a
historical and prospective summary of the status, opportunities, and
risks impacting the company's performance and financial condition.' 3
Though there is no specific requirement, this section has been
interpreted to call for the "disclosure of either social or
environmental information depending on the circumstances.' 4 This
area has much speculation and uncertainty, but there is evidence that
these types of disclosures are highly desirable and encouraged.' 2
120. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 96, at 143.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 147.
123. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a) (2015).
124. See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, An Emerging Third WaY? The Erosion of
the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493, 524 (2005).
125. See Mark A. Stach, Disclosure of Existing and Contingent Superfund Liability Under
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Second, although the dominant view of shareholder
responsibility is that a firm does not have an obligation to disclose
social and environmental information because such information is not
relevant or material to the financial condition of company, courts
have recognized that the SEC has the authority to require expanded
social and environmental disclosures but has only done so in a limited
number of ways.l6 The Court of Appeals for District of Columbia
has conceded that the SEC is not required to expand environmental
and social disclosure, but "acknowledged the SEC has broad
discretionary authority over what disclosure to require." '2'
For example, during litigation between the Natural Resources
Defense Council ("NRDC") and the SEC in the 1970s, the NRDC
sought to expand civil rights and environmental disclosure under
federal securities laws.t' 8  The court established that social and
environmental transparency is "within the scope of disclosure
authority contemplated by federal securities regulations. 29
Additionally, the court argued that because corporate social and
environmental practices may have economic impacts, the "disclosure
of this information is within the public interest and protects
investors. 1 30 Therefore, although there is no explicit requirement for
the SEC to require nonfinancial disclosure, it has the authority to do
so.
Third, if "material" is expanded to include nonfinancial
information, it will be possible to hold corporations liable for
misrepresentation based on the current practice of the word
"material": Rule 10b-5 mandates a duty not to mislead "by means of
misstated, untrue, outdated or omitted materialinformation. 1 3' The
duty to disclose is established by determining whether "in light of
the Reporting Requirements of the Federal Securities Lairs, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 355, 365
(1993).
126. See Williams, supra note 107, at 1299.
127. See Peter H. Huang, Mlood Investing and the Supreme Court: Rethinking the
Mlaterialit of Information and the Reasonableness of Investors, 13 S. CT. ECON. REV. 99, 112
(2005).
128. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 693-94 (D.D.C. 1974).
129. See Patricia Romano, Sustainable Development: A Strategy That Reflects the Effects
of Globaization on the InternationalPoifer Structure, 23 Hous. J. INT'L L. 91, 109-10 (2000).
130. Id.
131. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 96, at 170.
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what was omitted, what was said was misleading." 132 Finding
materiality under 10b-5 creates liability for nondisclosure under the
"half-truth" doctrine, which includes statements that have some
element of truth but are deceptive or omit some materialfact, thereby
making them misleading.133  Courts have held that half-truths, or
"'literally true statements that create a materially misleading
impression,"' may support securities fraud claims.1 34 Further, in order
for Rule 10b-5 to apply under the "half-truth" doctrine, the withheld
information must be material.1 35  Thus, if the noneconomic
information that corporations withhold is considered material, then
under this framework, it will be possible to hold corporations liable
for misrepresenting material information under the "half-truth"
doctrine.
In sum, a company's social and environmental information is
material information to investors and must be included under the
definition of "materiality" in 10(b)(5). A reasonable investor is not
only a profit-seeking investor.1 36  Investors rely on all forms of
information found in company reports, statements, and websites.1 37
Additionally, almost all social and environmental information is
tangibly related to the economic reality of a firm, but is considered to
be nonfinancial. 138  Corporate social and environmental management
actions, which are presumably instituted for long-term sustainability
132. See Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The luddle Dutr to Disclose Under
Rule lOb-, 57 VAND. L. REv. 1639, 1664 (2004).
133. See Huang, supra note 127, at 112.
134. Id.
135. However, the question of whether there is a pre-existing "duty to speak" in non-insider
trading situations remains open-ended. See Carol Swanson, Insider Trading Mladness: Rule
lOb-n and the Death of Scienter, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 147, 172-75 nn.138A5 (2003) (stating that
the only circumstances in which the Supreme Court has explicitly addressed the "when is silence
fraudulent?" question has been in insider trading cases, where the Court explicitly said it looked
to fiduciary principles in finding 10(b) violations.); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235
(1980) (stating in dicta that "when an allegation of fraud is based upon non-disclosure, there can
be no fraud absent a duty to speak" and that the duty to speak only arises because, as in insider
trading, one party has information "that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or
similar relation of trust and confidence between them.").
136. See John M. Newman, Jr., Mark Herrmann & Geoffrey J. Ritts, Basic Truths: The
Implications of the Fraud-on-the-M-arket Theorr for Evaluating the 'isleadin'" and
"Alaterialitr "Elements of Securities Fraud Claims, 20 J. CoRP. L. 571, 574 (1995).
137. Id.
138. See Monsma & Olson, supra note 96, at 174.
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purposes, are related to both the economic and social reality of the
firm's business.139 These types of disclosures may not immediately
enhance shareholder value, but such steps are material to ensure
overall company responsibility to its shareholders and stakeholders.140
V. CONCLUSION
Because the current system of corporate sustainability
disclosures is voluntary and lacks an enforcement mechanism, it is not
clear that all relevant information is being disclosed or that the
information being disclosed is accurate. This makes it difficult for
organizations such as GRI to meet their policy goals of increased
company transparency and corporate social responsibility. In order
to solve the issue of inadequate transparency in sustainability reports,
there must be some enforcement mechanism in place.
First, disclosure policies should be driven by a comply-or-explain
approach. Comply-or-explain provides some form of mandated
disclosures while ensuring flexibility among companies and assisting
stakeholders to make decisions. However, this approach does not
hold companies liable for the accuracy and completeness of their
reports. In order to truly solve the issue of inadequate transparency,
a source of legal accountability must be introduced. Perhaps
mandated standards are not currently desirable, but we can at least
make sure that the disclosures companies make in their sustainability
reports are accurate and complete. The 1934 Act provides us with a
legal framework to hold companies accountable to be completely
transparent about their social and environmental impacts. The
cumulative effect of comply-or-explain and 1934 Act enforcement will
thus ensure GRI's policy goals of transparency and corporate social
responsibility are realized.
Because of the existing value of non-economic company
reporting among investors, stakeholders, and governments, the legal
enforcement of company misrepresentation will likely gain support.
139. See Joseph A. Franco, K7V Antifraud Prohibitions Are Not Enough:The Significance
of the Opportunism, Candor, and Signalin g in the Economic Case for Mandator Securities
Disclosure, 20(2 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 223,356 (2002).
140. Id.
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Companies initially may be uncomfortable with the inflexibility of
reporting, mandatory requirements, and the fear of liability for their
misrepresentations. However, once factual and transparent reporting
becomes the norm, companies will eventually become more socially
responsible, in addition to being more profitable.
